Introduction
At 1,355 square miles, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is a wide expanse of land with mountain ranges, dry lake beds and a variety of plant and animal life. The climate is arid, with an average annual rainfall of approximately six inches or less on the lower elevations, an ideal setting for the ignition of wildland fires. Average rainfall does increase with elevation on the NNSS with nearly 7.5 inches in Area 18 and peaking at over twelve inches on Rainier Mesa.

Background
The NNSS Fire & Rescue (F&R) was established on October 9, 1951. Today, the F&R service provides fire suppression, emergency medical, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) mitigation, technical rescue response, incident command functions and fire prevention activities to the site on a 24-hour basis.

Prevention
Several strategies have been developed to mitigate the risks of wildland fires and provide protection for the surrounding public, personnel and property at the NNSS.

Annual vegetation assessments are conducted at the NNSS to prioritize removal of vegetation near utilities and other critical infrastructure. This helps to reduce fuel sources for fires that are created by dried out plants. In the event of a fire, these areas act as fire breaks and defensible space for firefighter access and anchor points.

Since 2012, F&R has increased its efforts in combatting wildland fires. In partnership with Air Resources Laboratory Special Operations and Research Division (ARL/SORD) and the Operations Command Center (OCC), F&R utilizes forecast weather data and lightning detection equipment to track storm cells as they move across the NNSS. As these storms produce dry lightning, the potential for wildland fires increases. F&R counters that by placing two, two-man crews on brush engines w/ all-terrain vehicles on wildland patrol. These crews, with the assistance of the OCC (controls the wildland fire cameras), patrol the area of the highest potential. If a strike is detected, crews will monitor the activity and if a fire starts, they will wait until the lightning activity decreases and the storm moves out before combatting the fire. These efforts have allowed F&R to control and extinguish 13 wildland fires in their incipient stages before becoming a significant fire.
Equipment

In addition to the standard array of firefighting equipment, F&R utilizes specially equipped all-terrain vehicles (ATV’s). The ATV’s are equipped with a small electric pump, utilizing a water/foam mix to produce 25 gallons of foam per one gallon of water.

Type 6 brush engines are also placed into service during a wildland situation utilizing class “A” firefighting foam, hose lines, hand tools and chain saws.

Cadres of heavy equipment operators are trained annually in fire safety to work in, around and near any wildland fire situation. These heavy equipment operators work under the direction of the Incident Commander and Staff. The dozers plow access roads and firebreaks as deemed necessary.

Water Masters are utilized by the same group assisting with wetting the areas for anchoring points, and in support of helicopter bucket operations.

Technology

The NNSS is a leader in developing innovative technology, some of which is applied to site firefighting efforts. For example, a helicopter pilot’s assigned duties related to national security can bring their skills and equipment to bear on wildland fires at the NNSS, performing water-drops in remote areas and flyovers of burned areas with thermal-imaging cameras to pinpoint hot spots.

In addition, aerial imagery can assess vegetation growth, which is an important predictor in how the fire may spread.

NNSS F&R maintains an electronic version of the “NNSS Known and Potential Hazards Map,” which enables firefighters to view different layers of the NNSS infrastructure; such as surface-laid cables, power lines, unexploded ordnance, bore holes, abandoned mine shafts, facilities storing hazardous materials and radiological areas. This approach helps to protect firefighters during their mitigation efforts.

The Threat of Wildland Fires to Radiological Areas

Because of the high probability of fires at the NNSS, the release and migration of airborne radioactive particles re-suspended by wildland fire on and around the NNSS has been studied and tracked for decades. Just over 7% or 100.3 square miles of the 1,355 square miles of the NNSS, as
identified through the Radionuclide Inventory and Distribution Program, has radioactive surface contamination. These areas are well known and have been characterized and mapped through a NNSS aerial radiation survey and are monitored triennially by personnel in the Radiological Control Demarcation Maintenance Program. Many of these areas are in remote, hard-to-reach locations. All are fenced and access is prohibited. The areas with highest levels of soil contamination are:

- Smoky site, Area 8
- Buggy site, Area 30
- Danny Boy, Little Feller I & II, Area 18
- Plutonium Valley, Area 11
- Sedan Site, Area 10
- Cabriolet and Schooner Sites, Area 20
- Wilson Site, Area 9

These sites combined, represent just over 2% or 30.8 square miles of the site with high soil contamination. If the areas are disturbed, the re-suspension of radioactive material that might be measured off-site could occur.

Based on the results of NNSS Annual Environmental Compliance Reports from 1992 through 2020, the NNSS has never experienced a wildland fire that spread into an area of high soil contamination.

**Preventing Re-suspension**

If a wildland fire occurs near one of the identified contaminated areas, fire personnel begin early preparations for possible expansion of the fire. Although radioactivity made airborne by a fire is not expected to result in significant health concerns to either on-site personnel or off-site members of the public, firefighters still take an aggressive approach to prevent the fire from crossing into one of those areas. As each fire is different, firefighters cannot take a “one-size-fits-all” approach.

**Methods of Re-suspension**

If a wildfire does occur in one of the NNSS radiological areas, it could result in measurable airborne radiation on the NNSS, and very low levels of measurable airborne radiation outside the NNSS boundaries. The re-suspension of radioactive materials during a wildland fire could be caused two ways. The first is through the burning of the plants within the contaminated area, and the second is by windstorms following a fire event. Once desert areas have burned, they are more susceptible to wind erosion. Then, this leads to the potential re-suspension of material.

**What are the Dangers to the Public?**

In 1994, a detailed radiological aerial survey was conducted of the NNSS. This data provides a basis from which to create dose calculations. Extremely conservative estimates of dose received from burning contaminated vegetation project the highest dose to on-site workers was calculated to be one...
millirem at 2.5 miles downwind. The highest dose to an off-site member of the public was calculated to be 0.1 millirem.

In an event that radiological contamination is re-suspended due to a fire, on-going continued monitoring would occur to detect any re-suspension from wind erosion or other forms of soil disturbance. A network of existing air monitors are in place throughout the NNSS. Additionally, air samplers would be established downwind from the site where radioactive soil contamination exists. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would also establish air monitors in public areas downwind from where a fire might be burning. The EPA would report their findings to the public and work with communities, counties and the state on the appropriate protective actions that would be required, if any.

Memorandums of Understanding

Government agencies use Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) to define relationships between different local, state and federal government entities. These agreements ensure smooth operations where there are shared resources or workflows. MOU’s create a platform for a clear understanding of each party’s commitments/purpose and specify the expectations for a series of pre-determined responses. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration and Nevada Field Office maintains MOU’s with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Air Force and the NNSS prime contractor to address specific wildland fire protection issues. Utilizing these agreements between outside agencies, provide procedures for quickly elevating the national priority in acquiring offsite resources to fight NNSS fires.

Conclusion

NNSS F&R experts take extreme preventative measures to reduce the risk of wildland fires. In the event that a significant wildland fire occurs, emergency personnel are well-trained and well-equipped to contain the fire before it can damage NNSS infrastructure or reach a radiological area. If a wildland fire does reach a radiological area, there is no evidence that indicates harmful levels of radiation may be re-suspended and transported to off-site populations. While it may be possible to detect minute amounts of re-suspended radioactivity, due to the remoteness of the NNSS and distance to off-site populations, there is ample time to issue protective actions, should they be necessary.